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Iit is a well-known correlation that the interface between the public and the private sector car-ries corruption risks (economakis et al., 2010).
A The inTegriTy siTuATion  
of insTiTuTions providing public 
services
The integrity analysis of the provision of public 
services is of primary importance, as citizens 
are in contact with public services on a daily 
basis: our children attend kindergarten and 
school, we see doctors, visit museums and use 
public utility services. The quality, availability 
and integrity of the public sector and public 
services can be one of the sources promoting 
the confidence of citizens. Despite this, the 
integrity of this area is rarely in the focus of 
corruption research Jain, nundy és abbasi, 
2014). corruption surveys often examine 
the corruption practice of major investments, 
tenders, official and control activities. inter-
national research mainly focuses on integrity 
challenges in healthcare from among human 
public services (abigail et al., 2009). studying 
the integrity of the healthcare of developing 
countries, Maureen (2006) states that the big-
gest challenge is posed by the deficit, illegal 
financing, corruption and inadequate admin-
istration. Morais et al. (2017) draw attention 
to the fact that the high level of corruption is 
related to low quality healthcare and educa-
tion services, as well as to a low standard of 
living. several studies, including surveys con-
ducted by Transparency international, deal 
with the phenomenon of the gratuity system. 
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Jain et al. (2014) claim that the bribe diverts 
resources from high priority services into the 
pockets of doctors. according to the authors, 
the payment of bribes to get “a little ahead, 
a little extra, a little quicker” can become in-
grained in people’s attitudes.
at the same time, in relation to the provision 
of public services, corruption risks may appear 
not only in the area of healthcare.
on the one hand, citizens are interested 
in receiving the best human and public util-
ity services of the highest quality provided by 
the state in optimal amount, at optimal time 
and price. on the other hand, deficit exists 
in several cases, which further increases cor-
ruption pressure. understandably, people 
wish to come on sooner in administration, 
achieve that their street is the first in which 
the sidewalk is paved and enrol their children 
in a school specialised in english etc. scarcity 
and excess demand play a key role in explain-
ing corruption in an economic sense. in rela-
tion to public utility services, Clarke and Xu 
(2002) state the following: if the need for ac-
cess to the public utility concerned (energy 
provider, telecommunications provider) ex-
ceeds the current possibilities of the public 
utility infrastructure, corruption contribution 
is added on the price of access, which is re-
alised as profit for the employees responsible 
for taking decisions on the expansion of the 
public utility or the repair of the service. The 
researchers found that in places where the in-
frastructure concerned enables extensive and 
equal access, corruption contribution was 
lower or less frequent. Regarding the structur-
al embeddedness of corruption, it is a warn-
ing sign that the likelihood of corruption is 
higher in societies of transition or at the early 
stage of capitalist development when there is 
excess demand for the rights provided or the 
resources redistributed by the state (Khan, 
2007). it can be established that no matter 
what public service is concerend, waiting for 
the service and the occurrence of corruption 
are closely related. in view of the above, it can 
be observed that the public-sector employee 
taking part in the provision of the public ser-
vice can deliberately delay the solution of the 
problem in order to establish stronger interest 
in bribery (lambsdorff, 2001). another case 
of corruption is when the fundamental prin-
ciple of the distribution of a specific public 
service is egalitarian, based on equality, while 
the public services organised along this princi-
ple is coupled with an unequal social structure 
in terms of its ability to enforce financial in-
terests. The argumentation that, if productive 
and less productive economic operators can 
use public utility services under the same con-
ditions it has a negative effect on the efficiency 
of the economy as a whole, is also based on the 
above concept. Here, corruption may contrib-
ute to the restoration of the pareto efficiency 
(Rashid, 1981).
Regulation of  the integrity of  domestic 
public bodies
in Hungary, the spread of the culture of in-
tegrity can be clearly monitored at the level 
of regulation (németh et al, 2017; lentner, 
2017). in particular, over the past seven years 
laws, guidelines, professional codes of ethics 
and government strategies have introduced 
integrity-enhancing tools that were previously 
unknown, or have rendered previously “soft” 
integrity controls legally binding. Yet, the in-
tegrity-oriented regulation of the provision of 
human public services and of the institutions 
carrying out such activities is lagging behind 
the enhancement of the personal integrity of 
public-sector and government officials.
certain elements of the national anti-cor-
ruption activity already came into existence af-
ter the change of regime. However, the system 
of anti-corruption institutions integrated into 
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the strategic action plan was established only 
in 2011. The fundamental law adopted in 
2011 prescribes that subsidies and payments 
from the government budget can be trans-
ferred to transparent organisations only. The 
fundamental law also states that every organ-
isation managing public funds is required to 
publicly account for its management of public 
funds, as the data of public funds and national 
assets are of public interest. in 2012, a govern-
ment decision on anti-corruption government 
measures and the public administration’s cor-
ruption prevention programme was adopted. 
The main goal of the programme is to sup-
press corruption related to public services and 
increase the resistance of the institutions. in 
order to enhance the personal integrity of 
public-sector employees and government offi-
cials, the government published a Green book 
on the ethical requirements at government 
bodies, which was followed by the introduc-
tion of codes of ethics in different professions.
as of 2013 a government decree prescribes 
the elements of the integrity management sys-
tem to be implemented on a compulsory ba-
sis for public administration bodies under the 
supervision of the government [Government 
Decree no. 50/2013 (ii. 25.) on the integrity 
Management system of public administra-
tion bodies and the order of Receiving lob-
byists]. based on this, public administration 
bodies have to annually assess the integrity 
risks related to their operation and draw up an 
action plan based on the risk assessment. The 
leader of the organisation must ensure that the 
organisation receives and investigates reports 
on integrity risks. The integrity advisor, whose 
employment is compulsory at such bodies, is 
to take part in the assessment of integrity risks, 
in the preparation of the action plan for man-
aging such risks and the integrity report on 
the implementation of the plan. The advisor 
is to plan the anti-corruption trainings of the 
organisation and give advice to the employ-
ees of the organisation on ethical questions 
related to their profession on occasional basis. 
The aforementioned Government Decree also 
prescribes that the employees of a public ad-
ministration body can meet lobbyists only in 
connection with the fulfilment of their tasks, 
after prior notification to their superior.
no similar compulsory integrity manage-
ment system applies to public service provid-
ers and public-sector employees. at the same 
time, the integrity-enhancing provisions of 
Government Decree no. 370/2011 (Xii. 31.) 
on the internal control system and on the in-
ternal audit of central budgetary institutions 
must be applied to a wider range of public 
administration bodies, including a significant 
percentage of service providers. However, the 
rules enhancing organisational integrity are 
less integrity-specific than the rules applying 
to public administration bodies. basically, 
they incorporate integrity-enhancing process-
es into the integrated risk management system. 
However, it is obvious progress that Govern-
ment Decree no. 370/2011 (Xii. 31.) on the 
internal control system and on the internal 
audit of central budgetary institutions de-
fines the term “event damaging organisational 
integrity”, and prescribes that the leader of a 
budgetary institution is to regulate the rules of 
procedure of the management of events dam-
aging organisational integrity, the methodol-
ogy of the assessment of the reported events, 
the method of collecting the information re-
quired for the investigation of the report, as 
well as the rules of procedure of interview-
ing the people concerned. it is an important 
provision that each Hungarian budgetary in-
stitution is to take the necessary measures to 
prevent events damaging organisational integ-
rity and establish rules for the protection and 
recognition of the whistle-blower within the 
organisation and the provision of information 
about the results of the investigation.
There is no standard statutory definition 
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for the term “public service”. The provision of 
public service tasks is detailed by sectoral leg-
islation. pursuant to point d) of section 3 of 
act cXXV of 2003 on equal Treatment and 
promotion of equal opportunities, “public 
service is a service for the purpose of satisfying 
the basic needs of people based contractual obli-
gation, in particular electricity, gas etc.” accord-
ing to the definition of act cXcVi of 2011 
on national assets, the aim of the fulfilment 
of public duties is to provide public services to 
the population, satisfy the basic needs/inter-
ests of the general public and the community 
and provide the infrastructure for the fulfil-
ment of the aforementioned tasks. The leg-
islation on waste management and chimney 
sweeping activities also refer to the fact that 
such activities are considered public services.
Research objective
The research objective: based on the assess-
ment of the risks threatening organisational 
integrity in the course of the provision of 
public services, we wish to present the most 
wide-spread factors increasing corruption risk 
at public service providers, as well as describe 
how the institutions develop and operate their 
controls to mitigate such risks.
MeThods
Target area, database
The national data collection took place in 
2017 on 7 occasions by means of electronic 
questionnaire that was downloadable from the 
integrity portal of the state audit office of 
Hungary. The 2017 survey covered the period 
between 1 January 2016 and 31 December 
2016, but some questions concerned the past 
three years. Where a question did not include 
reference to the three-year period, respondents 
were requested to provide data concerning the 
situation as at 31 December 2016.
The database of the public bodies that took 
part in the 2017 survey was based on the mas-
ter register of the Hungarian state Treasury 
as at 31 December 2016. in 2017, 10,245 
organisations featured in the database were 
requested to take part in the survey. for ex-
ample, school districts, minority self-govern-
ments (except for the national minority self-
governments) and those organisation which 
had a piR number but did not have an e-mail 
address (e.g. certain local government associa-
tions, economic service providers, etc.) were 
not invited.1 in the general request letter sent 
to the local governments, we asked them to 
complete a separate questionnaire for those 
budgetary institutions which have their own 
piR numbers and are maintained by the local 
governments. Data collection took place from 
25 May 2017 to 14 July 2017.
Sructure of  the questionnaire
our primary goal was to identify the charac-
teristics of corruption risks at public sector in-
stitutions. in order to specify the corruption 
risks threatening public institutions and the 
development level of the relevant controls, we 
used a questionnaire consisting of 16 question 
groups with altogether 169 questions. institu-
tions with different legal status and belong-
ing to a different group completed the same 
standard questionnaire. The majority of the 
169 questions are dichotomous (yes-no) ques-
tions. in order to adjust the questionnaire to 
institutional characteristics, in some cases, 
the “not applicable” option was added. apart 
from the questions above, the structure of the 
questionnaire also includes multiple-choice 
questions, some of which offer one, while oth-
ers offer several answers. The third question 
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group contains questions where the respond-
ing organisation provides a response by enter-
ing various numerical data. The completion of 
the questionnaire was voluntary. During the 
data collection period, the questionnaire was 
available on the following website: http://in-
tegritas.asz.hu/.
Data processing, forming indices
after receiving the responses to the question-
naire, the available data set was organised and 
cleaned. The individual variables were made 
processable by means of statistical methods 
and analysed the ibM spss statistics and 
the Microsoft excel programmes. Those cases 
where the respondents had not provided data 
or any answers that could be evaluated were 
regarded as incomplete data in the system. 
based on the responses to the questionnaire, 
by means of a pre-defined algorithm, the 
computer survey and data processing system 
calculates an index in a percentage form, rep-
resenting the involvement of the institutions 
in corruption (báger, 2011).
These are the following:
The inherent Vulnerability index (iVi), 
which makes the components of the inherent 
vulnerability that depend on the legal status 
and tasks of organisations measurable. The in-
dex is defined by factors whose formation falls 
within the legislative authority of the found-
ing body, such as (legal) regulation, applica-
tion of law by the authorities or the provision 
of various (educational, healthcare, social and 
cultural) public services.
The enhanced factors index (efi), which 
captures the components that increase inher-
ent vulnerability depending on the day-to-day 
operation of various institutions. it maps the 
characteristics of the legal/institutional envi-
ronment of budgetary institutions, the pre-
dictability and stability of their operation, as 
well as variable factors – fundamentally shaped 
by the decisions of current management – that 
arise during the operation of institutions, such 
as the definition of strategic goals, the estab-
lishment of organisational structure and cul-
ture, as well as the management of human and 
budgetary resources and public procurements 
(pulay, 2014).
The existence of controls index (eoci) re-
flects whether a given organisation has institu-
tionalised controls in place, and whether those 
controls actually function and effectively meet 
their goals. This index includes factors such 
as the internal regulation of the organisation, 
external and internal auditing, as well as other 
integrity controls: defining ethical require-
ments, managing situations involving con-
flicts of interest, handling reports and com-
plaints, regular risk analysis and conscious 
strategic management.
in respect to the corruption risks and con-
trols of public services, we analysed the results 
of the latest survey conducted in 2017. based 
on the questions of the integrity survey, we 
selected the risks related to public services and 
the key controls covering them. in the area of 
providing public services, an aggregate risk in-
dex was formed from the risk-increasing fac-
tors (an inherent vulnerability index, as well as 
seven risk-increasing factors). in order to de-
termine the control level, an index was formed 
on the basis of eight controls mitigating the 
risk of public services. Table 1 contains the 
components of the indices.
Sample, the number of  organisations 
responding to the questions
in 2017, altogether 3,346 organisations com-
pleted and returned questionnaires that could 
be evaluated. in the course of data processing, 
the organisations responding to the questions 
were classified into 15 groups of institutions, 
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Table 1
QUESTIONS AND INDICES RELATED TO PUBLIC SERVICES
QUESTION 
NO.
QUESTION INDEX TyPE
55 does your organisation provide any public service to satisfy community needs based on a 
statutory requirement (e.g. nursery or kindergarten care, public education, higher education, 
healthcare or other welfare services, energy supply, drinking water supply, public transport, 
waste management, etc.)?  
ivi fundam
ental 
question
56 if your organisation provides public services, do they include any where user demand 
for the particular service typically exceeds the available service supply permanently and 
substantially? 
ivi
risk index
57 if your organisation provides public services, is any of them subject to a fee? efi
58 if your organisation provides public services, is the service fee determined by your 
organisation? 
efi
59 if your organisation provides public services, does the organisation have powers to waive or 
reduce the service fee for equity? 
efi
60 if your organisation provides public services, can clients fully learn the terms of using 
public services? 
efi
61 if your organisation provides public services, does its policy for providing public services 
enable the use of services under individual terms – based on a special decision by the 
organisation? 
efi
62 if your organisation provides public services, has it established a system for managing 
complaints related to public services?
efi
90 did your organisation receive, either directly or indirectly (e.g. through a foundation) any 
grant, monetary or other material support from private organisations or individuals in the 
last year?
efi
63 if clients receive benefits in cash or in kind as part of public services, do you prepare an 
official delivery-acceptance certificate about this?
eoci
control index
119 how does your organisation regulate conflict of interest? eoci
120 do your organisation’s internal regulations require staff to declare any business or other 
interest that is relevant for the organisation’s activity?
eoci
121 does your organisation regulate the terms of accepting various gifts, invitations and trips? eoci
122 does your organisation have an internal policy for protecting whistle-blowers within the 
organisation?
eoci
133 if some of your organisation’s staff are required to file an asset declaration, is their scope 
specified accurately?
eoci
154 does your organisation operate a system to manage external complaints (i.e. from outside 
the organisation)?
eoci
155 does your organisation operate a system to manage whistle-blowing? eoci
159 does your organisation have workplace rotation in place? eoci
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based on their sectoral codes (nace) in the 
register of the Hungarian state Treasury.
in the framework of the data collection, 
10,245 public bodies were requested to re-
spond of whom 3,346 institutions sent back 
a questionnaire that could be evaluated (see: 
Figure 1). in the case of the majority of the 
institution groups, our sample cannot be con-
sidered as representative. Where our sample 
does not show any signs of representativity, the 
results cannot be projected to all public bod-
ies. although the composition of the respond-
ents does not fulfil the requirements of rep-
resentativity, general trends can be described 
due to the large sample size. The base sample 
includes groups of institutions in which the 
respondent institutions and the institutional 
group segment of the base sample completely 
cover each other (government bodies, regional 
administrative bodies). The survey provided 
a complete overview of the changes affecting 
such institution types.
in each annual data survey, local govern-
ments form the institution group with the 
highest sample unit number. in the 2017 data 
survey, 47% of all the respondent institutions 
were local governments. consequently, chang-
es in this group can affect the risk and control 
level of the public sector on their own. The 
appearance of integrity advisors responsible 
for corruption risk analysis at administrative 
bodies under the management or supervision 
of the government, except at law enforcement 
agencies and the Military national security 
service, presumably had an influence on the 
change in the number of institutions complet-
ing the questionnaire. The high participation 
was supported by the government decree on 
Figure 1
POPULATION AND SAMPLE UNIT NUMBERS RELATED TO DATA SURVEy
12,870
10,245
3,346
Number of the invited institutions=target  
population
Base population
Number of respondents
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the national anti-corruption programme 
and on the action plan on related measures 
for 2015–2016, in which the government 
promoted participation in the integrity sur-
vey conducted by the state audit office of 
Hungary, as well as by an initiative of the 
state audit office of Hungary called integrity 
supporters’ Group (németh, Vargha, 2017). 
These were the organisations that committed 
to take part in the anti-corruption survey con-
ducted by the state audit office of Hungary 
each year until 2017.
More institutions took part in the 2017 data 
survey than ever before. The number of re-
spondents exceeded the 2016 figure by 11.5%, 
and was three times as high as the participation 
rate of the first survey in 2011 (see Figure 2).
The institutions taking part in the 2017 
survey employ 61.9% of public-sector em-
ployees (government officials, civil servants, 
public-sector employees). new participants 
joined from local governments, other admin-
istrative bodies, law enforcement and military 
agencies. The institutions joining the survey 
also affected the change of the indices due to 
their scope of responsibilities and legal status 
(see: Table 2).
resulTs
Public service: risks and controls
based on the data of the survey, 64% of the re-
sponding institutions provide public services. 
When analysing the responses by institution 
group, it is observable that the percentage of 
institutions that answered yes to this question 
was the highest in the case of higher educa-
tion institutions (100%), healthcare institu-
tions (91%), kindergartens and crèches (87%) 
and social care institutions (83%). on the 
Figure 2
CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF RESPONDENT INSTITUTIONS (2011–2017)
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other hand, only 51% of cultural institutions 
answered yes. The respondent independent 
government bodies and institutions dealing 
with scientific research and development do 
not provide public services, while only 8% 
of law enforcement and defence institutions 
carry out such activity.
Integrity risks
We then examined to what extent public ser-
vice providers are threatened by risks and have 
controls related to public services. Figure 3 
shows the distribution of the responses given 
to the questions by institution group, more 
specifically, the percentage of institutions that 
are threatened by the given risk. The last col-
umn of the figure shows the averages of risks in 
the circle where public services are provided.
based on our findings, the provision of 
chargeable services means a high risk level. 
77% of the institutions surveyed provide 
chargeable service. The level of the aforemen-
tioned risk is higher than the average in the 
groups of healthcare institutions, other ad-
ministrative bodies, institutions responsible 
for other activities, higher education, local 
governments, jurisdiction, government bod-
ies, cultural institutions, social care institu-
tions and regional administrative bodies.
corruption risk is further increased if the 
organisation itself sets the service charge. The 
aforementioned risk is typical in 44 percent of 
the organisations questioned. in the group of 
healthcare institutions, this rate is 71%, which 
considerably exceeds the average of all the re-
spondents, just like in the groups of higher 
Table 2
CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF RESPONDENT INSTITUTIONS By INSTITUTION GROUP  
(2013–2017)
Name of the institution group (2017) years
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
primary and secondary education 201 288 133 81 68
healthcare institutions 54 53 110 110 110
other - administrative institutions 46 48 195 175 184
other activities 41 47 14 72 27
higher education 22 23 25 23 22
independent state authorities 6 6 9 12 10
local governments 670 706 1,106 1,376 1,574
Jurisdiction 22 25 29 23 27
government bodies 7 7 8 10 8
cultural and recreational institutions 65 62 185 223 248
Kindergarten, crèche 147 153 303 380 571
law enforcement and national defence 64 61 123 123 118
institutions providing social services 82 74 276 354 340
regional administrative bodies 24 20 20 20 20
scientific research, development 11 11 22 20 19
Total 1,462 1,584 2,557 3,002 3,346
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education institutions, local governments and 
cultural institutions.
The possibility of exercising equity is a top 
priority risk factor. 33% of our public institu-
tions enable this. at the same time, 82% of 
higher education institutions responded that 
they were entitled to reduce service charges for 
reasons of equity, which is significantly higher 
than the average of institution groups with 
similar powers. almost half of the healthcare 
institutions, government bodies and cultural 
institutions answered yes to this question.
The lack of an opportunity to learn about 
the conditions of the use of public services sig-
nificantly increases the risk of corruption. it 
can particularly damage public confidence if 
citizens are not familiar with the reasons based 
on which certain equity decisions are taken. 
Merely 2% of the respondents answered no 
to this question, therefore this risk factor does 
not exist in most institution groups. only law 
enforcement and defence institutions provide 
significantly less than average opportunities 
for citizens to learn about the conditions of 
using the public service they offer.
in addition to the possibility of exercising 
equity, using services under specific conditions 
also significantly increases corruption risk. 
37% of our domestic public institutions en-
able this. in this respect, cultural institutions, 
higher education institutions, healthcare in-
stitutions, general and primary education in-
stitutions exceed the average of all public ser-
vice providers.
The lack of a system for handling incoming 
complaints also poses an integrity risk. This 
deficiency could be observed at 30% of the 
public bodies surveyed. The findings of the 
research definitely prove that the lack of a 
complaint handling system is more than the 
average in the following categories: other – 
administrative activities, other activities, lo-
cal governments, cultural institutions, kin-
dergarten, crèche and regional administrative 
bodies. The aforementioned problem is espe-
cially serious as the institutions in these areas 
provide a wide range of public services, but 
citizens cannot report the irregularities they 
experience, the organisations do not identify 
the problems, do not handle the complaints, 
therefore services cannot be developed.
The acceptance of donations and aids also 
poses an integrity risk to a certain extent. sev-
eral institution groups give the opportunity 
(e.g. via foundations, helplines) for citizens 
and economic operators to support their op-
eration by offering donations, aids and mate-
rial contributions (40%). This poses a risk as 
citizens may attempt to gain personal advan-
tage by supporting the foundation of an insti-
tution. Healthcare institutions, higher educa-
tion, government bodies, cultural institutions, 
kindergartens, crèches and institutions pro-
viding social services are most at risk.
excess demand for their services especially 
increases the risk of corruption. 17% of the 
respondents answered yes to the question: “if 
your organisation provides public services, do 
these include any where user demand for the 
particular service typically exceeds the avail-
able service supply permanently and substan-
tially?”. at the same time, there are major dif-
ferences between various types of institutions. 
Healthcare institutions, higher education, the 
social welfare system face the highest excess 
demand, which poses a more serious threat 
not only to their integrity situation, but to the 
equitable access of citizens to public services, 
as well.
Risk-Reducing Controls
after the risk levels, we also examined the 
control levels related to public services in each 
institution group (see: Figure 4).
in the case of benefits in cash or in kind, 
89% of public service providers drafted an 
official handover document, which is a fun-
damental integrity control factor. in the 
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group of other activities, this proportion is 
only 67%.
in the case of asset declaration obligation, 
84% of the respondent institutions deter-
mined the circle of persons obliged to make 
an asset declaration, thus controlling possible 
wealth increase that may damage integrity.
Workplace rotation – as a possible means of 
control – is not widespread. according to in-
ternational professional literature, workplace 
rotation is a necessary means of control when 
frequent meetings lead to personal relation-
ships, which may be an advantage in taking 
certain decisions (burguet et al., 2016, Tunley 
et al., 2017). it should be noted, however, that 
it is usually a requirement at authorities and 
controlling institutions. examining the situ-
ation in Hungary, we found that only 12% 
of the institutions use this instrument. This 
control is the most widespread at regional ad-
ministrative bodies, in the group of law en-
forcement and defence institutions, at govern-
ment bodies and in the group of healthcare 
institutions, while its use is above the average 
at social care institutions, cultural institutions 
and judiciary institutions.
The system of public interest disclosures/
whistleblowing is not very well-established 
in Hungary (31%). some groups of institu-
tions, such as institutions carrying out other 
activities, cultural institutions, kindergartens 
and crèches, are even significantly below the 
low average in this respect. The lack of this 
system draws attention to the fact that the re-
porting of activities that damage integrity and 
the elimination of the detected irregularities 
in operation is difficult without such a system.
85% of the institutions regulates the issue 
of conflict of interest, which greatly pro-
motes integrity.
However, the lack of regulating the ac-
ceptance of gifts, invitations and travels draws 
attention to a major anomaly within public 
sector integrity. only 24% of the respondents 
applied this fundamental means of control. in 
relation to public services, bribery and cor-
ruption are topics that come up all the time. 
public service providers who do not regulate 
the acceptance of gifts are particularly threat-
ened. Regulating the acceptance of gifts, 
invitations and travels is inadequate at edu-
cational institutions, from kindergartens to 
universities, at healthcare, cultural and social 
care institutions and at local governments. in 
other groups of institutions, for example in 
the area of law enforcement and defence, as 
well as at judiciary institutions, this type of 
control is well-established.
less than half of the institutions oblige 
their employees in their internal policies to 
make a declaration about their economic inter-
ests. However, identifying economic interests 
for certain activities and positions in decision-
making is a fundamental means of control. 
as far as the regulation of other interests is 
concerned, the percentage of the institutions 
belonging to the group of other activities is 
remarkably low.
in conclusion: organizations that charge a 
fee for the public services they provide, the 
ones that are under strong demand pressure or 
have broad discretion, but do not have coun-
terbalancing special controls particularly carry 
risk (e.g. regulation of complaint handling, 
regulation of the conditions of the acceptance 
of gifts, regulation of conflict of interest and 
the declaration of economic interests, etc.) in 
the next part of our study, we will examine the 
development of key controls related to special 
risks.
Relationships between the risks of  public 
services and their controls
after examining risk and control levels, we 
explored the relationship between them. We 
wanted to find out whether institutions with 
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higher risk levels had developed integrity con-
trols to a greater extent in order to mitigate 
risks.
In Figure 5, the columns show the per-
centage of those respondents that claimed to 
provide public services.2 The green or black 
dashed lines indicate the aggregate risk and 
control indices of such institutions. The value 
of correlation between the two indices in the 
group where the percentage of public service 
providers exceeds 30% is 0.9, which shows a 
strong, positive relationship. consequently, 
based on the findings of the research, in insti-
tution groups which provide a higher percent-
age of public services, the coverage by controls 
was higher if the risk level was higher.
on the other hand, when assessing the rela-
tionship between the risk and control indices 
related to public services of all the respondent 
institutions, the relationship is weak and neg-
ative: –0.3. The value draws attention to the 
fact that the relationship between the control 
and risk indices of public service providers is 
stronger than in the case of all the respond-
ents (public service providers and institutions 
that do not provide any public services). The 
control levels of some organisations that pro-
vide public services at a lower rate (law en-
forcement and defence, regional administra-
tive bodies, government bodies, jurisdiction) 
are strikingly high, which might be related to 
their official and control activity.
Special risks and controls
if we examine certain key risks and the key 
controls that mitigate such risks, the charac-
Figure 5
THE WEIGHED INDICATORS OF THE RISK AND CONTROL INDICES OF PUBLIC SERVICE 
PROVIDERS RELATED TO PUBLIC SERVICES By INSTITUTION GROUP
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teristics of the individual institutions can be 
more deeply observed. The identification of 
the characteristics of such risks at public in-
stitutions helps to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of the related control system, as 
well as the possibilities for the development 
of the system. We will present three out of the 
key risks and controls in detail.
Excess demand, accepting gifts, invitations 
and trips
The equitable distribution of public services, 
that is the use of public services on a legiti-
mate need, may be damaged in practice if the 
demand and supply are out of balance and 
there is excess demand for a certain service 
(Vasvári et al., 2017). The corruption risk will 
be generated by the fact the due to the sup-
ply “shortage”, citizens will be interested in 
buying the services from other providers faster 
and in a higher quality. on the other hand, 
service providers and those who are involved 
in the provision of services at a certain level 
(representatives of the authorities, experts, 
etc.) shall take advantage of the situation by 
giving priority to their own interests and ig-
noring the fundamental principles of public 
service. The risk level is reduced if public ser-
vice providers have policies on the acceptance 
of gifts, travels and other benefits.
by means of a regression procedure, we ex-
amined how the supply shortage affects the 
institutions’ gift policy (that is how the risk 
affects the establishment of controls). The in-
crease of the shortage by one unit increases 
the level of the regulatory environment by 
0.102 on average. The p value of the regres-
sion model is 0.729. based on this, shortage 
is not a significant parameter, therefore it does 
not affect the extent of regulation. in the light 
of the above, it can be stated that there is no 
relationship between excess demand and the 
regulation of the acceptance of gifts and other 
benefits, therefore those institutions at which 
there is significant excess demand for a specific 
service are not more likely to regulate more 
the order of acceptance of gifts and other ben-
efits.
our findings warn that in the case of cer-
tain groups of service providers, demand may 
permanently exceed supply (e.g. in the case of 
higher education and healthcare institutions). 
at the same time, barely a quarter of these 
groups of institutions (26–27%) have a policy 
regulating the conditions of the acceptance of 
gifts, invitations and travels. However, a high 
percentage of those groups of institutions (e.g. 
government bodies, jurisdiction, law enforce-
ment and defence institutions) that do not or 
hardly ever face such type of risk have a gift 
policy (see: Figure 6).
Charges set by the organisation and systems for 
the disclosure of information of public interest 
(whistleblowing)
More than three quarters of public service 
providers (77%) provide chargeable services. 
44% of the organisations themselves set the 
service charge. in the case of services pro-
vided by public authorities, especially if the 
organisation itself sets the charge, it is impor-
tant that in the course of the provision of the 
service, the people who are involved in a cor-
ruption attempt or are offered certain benefits 
or detect such a case can make a complaint 
or a report of public interest. The risk arising 
from setting the service charge can be set off if 
the organisation operates a system to manage 
external complaints (i.e. from outside the or-
ganisation). based on our findings, only 36% 
of service providers operate this control.
by means of regression analysis, we estab-
lished that a one-unit increase in the charges 
set by the organisations reduces the extent 
of establishing a complaint handling system 
by 0.246 units. The p value of the regression 
model is 0.361. based on this, the charges set 
by the organisations do not represent a sig-
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nificant parameter, therefore this variable does 
not affect the extent of the complaint han-
dling system.
When examining the individual groups of 
institutions, it can be observed that in the case 
of local governments, institutions carrying 
out other administrative activities and cultur-
al institutions, the percentage of institutions 
operating the aforementioned control is the 
lowest, along with a higher than average risk 
value of the charges set by the organisations 
(see: Figure 7).
The provision of public services and 
information on the terms of use
in relation to public services, the fundamen-
tal needs of citizens include information on 
what type of public service they are entitled 
to and a transparent decision-making process. 
Transparency and predictability are the basic 
pillars of the integrity approach, therefore we 
examined the relationship between the provi-
sion of the public service and the information 
provided on the terms of its use.
based on the results of the survey, citizens 
are entitled to use domestic public services 
mainly on the basis of objective, pre-deter-
mined criteria. The majority of organisation 
groups provide extensive information to their 
clients on the terms of use of public services. 
such terms include terms of entitlement speci-
fied by law, as well as pre-established criteria by 
the individual organisations. The availability 
of the criteria is of primary importance if the 
service is provided on the grounds of equity.
The high integrity level of domestic pub-
lic services is indicated by the fact that based 
on the answers, citizens are almost fully in-
formed on the terms of use of public services 
(see: Figure 8).
Figure 6
REGULATION OF EXCESS DEMAND AND GIFT-GIVING IN CERTAIN  
INSTITUTION GROUPS
Groups of institutions
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conclusions
The public services provided by the state great-
ly influence the physical and mental wellbe-
ing of citizens (healthcare, public education, 
drinking water, heating). citizens are strongly 
interested in maximising the use of such public 
services for themselves, even to the detriment 
of others or illegally (evasion of waiting lists, 
influencing the system of entrance exams). 
such abusive distribution of public services 
leads to the unequal access to the services that 
should be available based on the principle of 
equality, which influences citizens’ confidence 
in the state and its institutions to a great ex-
tent. in the light of the above, the integrity of 
public service providing institutions is crucial.
based on our results, among typical public 
service providers, integrity risks and the estab-
lishment of controls change simultaneously. 
The higher the risk level, the better-established 
the controls. furthermore, the research also 
shone light on the fact that irrespective of the 
risk level, the integrity control level of other 
institution groups with other official or con-
trol functions (the police, national defence) 
and that of independent public bodies is high. 
it is definitely due to the fact that in the case 
of institutions providing human public servic-
es, there are less so-called hard controls, that 
is, compulsory control elements prescribed 
by law. consequently, voluntarily established 
controls can better follow the identified integ-
rity risks. This finding could be good news, 
but our research also revealed that in certain 
situations that significantly threaten integrity, 
the key controls that could mitigate the risk 
had not been established.
in the area of public services, the provision 
of chargeable services, the possibility of exercis-
Figure 7
THE RATE OF CHARGES SET By ORGANISATIONS AND THE OPERATION OF THE EXTERNAL 
COMPLAINT HANDLING SySTEM IN THE INDIVIDUAL GROUPS OF INSTITUTIONS
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ing equity and the excess demand for the ser-
vices carry the most significant integrity risks.
as far as public service providers are con-
cerned, the documentation of benefits in cash 
and in kind, as well as the regulation of con-
flict of interest and asset declaration are ad-
equately established controls.
However, the lack of preparedness for han-
dling public interest disclosures and com-
plaints is clearly obvious. The operation of 
the internal and external reporting system is 
necessary so that the organisation can learn 
about and handle events that damage integ-
rity, appropriately assess risks and establish the 
required controls. The fact that the citizens’ 
complaints cannot properly and officially ap-
pear in the system may further weaken the 
confidence of citizens and strengthen the ten-
dency of attempting to seek remedy for the 
disadvantages they suffer through shortcuts, 
evading the official procedures. However, 
whistleblowing systems can only fulfil their 
function if appropriate protection is provid-
ed for all those reporting the irregularity, as 
without this it may be too risky to report the 
integrity-breaching behaviour of a colleague.
The fact that the acceptance of gifts, invi-
tations and travels is inadequately regulated 
at Hungarian public service providers carries 
significant corruption risks. The lack of regu-
lation is an especially serious problem among 
the public service providers at which demand 
Figure 8
THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES AND INFORMATION  
ON THE TERMS OF USE3
Groups of institutions
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is permanently higher than supply. The afore-
mentioned phenomenon was measured at 
healthcare and higher education institutions. 
at the same time, it should be mentioned that 
in the area of higher education, excess demand 
mainly affects the entrance exams to universi-
ties and colleges. in this area, a new control, 
i.e., the automation of decision-making pro-
cesses, which is one of the most effective fac-
tors promoting integrity, has been introduced. 
for almost one decade now, the ranking of the 
applicants to higher education institutions is 
being calculated by a computer based on the 
acquired points. The applicants are automati-
cally notified by the computer system. as 
an employee in higher education (erzsébet 
németh), i also experienced that suddenly, af-
ter the introduction of the system, almost all 
the calls for laying on influence for somebody 
– which used to be so frequent before – sud-
denly stopped.
it may cause serious tension and extraordi-
narily erode confidence in the service if people 
who use the service cannot see clearly why one 
patients has to wait longer than the other in 
the casualty department. confidence has also 
a placebo effect in healthcare. not to men-
tion that it also improves the cooperation of 
patients. in other words, if patients trust the 
doctor and have confidence in the treatment, 
they can follow the doctor’s instructions bet-
ter and the effect will be better, as well.
of course, it is not possible to serve pa-
tients with the help of a meter greeter every-
where, on a first-come first-served basis, but 
it would be possible and necessary to identify 
risks, establish rules, make them available and 
establish other controls.
1 The registration iD number issued by the Hungarian 
state Treasury.
2 interestingly, in certain groups (kindergartens, 
crèches, schools or social care institutions), only 
80% of the institutions claimed to provide public 
services, however, it is obvious that the main activity 
of these institutions was the public service itself.
3  comment: as only those were allowed to answer 
the control question (the availability of aspects) 
who answered yes to the question about risk (the 
provision of public service), the diagram shows the 
yes answers to the question about the availability 
of aspects in proportion to the organisations which 
answered yes to the question on the provision of 
public service.
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